Anti-SLAPP protection

Indiana statute Ind. Code § 34-7-7 was enacted in 1998.

Law summary

Indiana’s anti-SLAPP statute protects people from lawsuits resulting from their exercise of the right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue. To challenge a lawsuit as a SLAPP in Indiana, it must be shown that the plaintiff is suing for an “act or omission of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Indiana in connection with a public issue” (Ind. Code § 34-7-7-5(1)). Additionally, it must be established that the defendant’s actions were “taken in good faith and with a reasonable basis in law and fact” (Ind. Code § 34-7-7-5(2)).

Legal Actions

Indiana’s anti-SLAPP law includes four key features:

• Motion to dismiss: A defendant can file a motion to dismiss if they believe the lawsuit arises from their protected activities.
• Discovery proceedings: When a motion to dismiss is filed, all discovery proceedings related to the case are temporarily halted. The only exception is discovery relevant to the motion to dismiss.
• Accelerated hearing: The court must establish a reasonable timeframe, which cannot exceed 180 days, to rule on the motion to dismiss.
• Attorney fees: If the defendant wins the motion to dismiss, they can recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. However, if the motion is deemed frivolous or intended to cause unnecessary delay, the plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred in responding to the motion.

Helpful cases

The cases below demonstrate how Indiana courts interpreted the anti-SLAPP statutes in defamation cases involving various forms of media.

Hamilton v. Prewett (2007)

Paul Hamilton filed a defamation lawsuit against Morgan Prewett over a satirical website that negatively portrayed Hamilton and his business. Prewett filed a motion to dismiss under Indiana’s anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that the website was a form of protected free speech under the First Amendment. The trial court granted Prewett’s motion, concluding that Hamilton had not demonstrated the necessary elements for a defamation claim. The Court of Appeals of Indiana affirmed the trial court’s decision, emphasizing that the website’s content was clearly satirical and could not reasonably be interpreted as factual, thus falling under protected speech. However, the court also ruled that Indiana’s anti-SLAPP statute did not apply in this case because Hamilton’s lawsuit was not intended to stifle Prewett’s speech on a public issue or matter of public interest. Prewett’s request for attorney’s fees under the anti-SLAPP statute was denied.

Pack v. Truth Publishing Company, Inc. (2019)

Kevin Pack, a former public high school German teacher, sued Truth Publishing for defamation after the newspaper reported on Pack’s lawsuit against his former employer, alleging wrongful termination due to his atheism. Pack claimed that the article defamed him by labeling him “incompetent.” The Elkhart Superior Court dismissed the defamation claim under Indiana’s anti-SLAPP statute. The Indiana Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal, finding the article addressed a public concern and that the newspaper acted in good faith and based its article on reliable sources. The publication was found to have a reasonable basis in law and fact, and thus the anti-SLAPP statute was applicable.

Stabosz v. Friedman (2022)

Timothy Stabosz, elected auditor of LaPorte County, made public comments on social media and via emails suggesting that Shaw Friedman, the LaPorte County attorney, had engaged in illegal and unethical behavior. Friedman filed a lawsuit against Stabosz, alleging defamation per se. Stabosz claimed the lawsuit was a SLAPP and moved to dismiss under Indiana’s anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court denied his motion, but Stabosz appealed. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s conclusion that the case did not qualify as a SLAPP under the state statute. Crucially, Friedman had designated sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Stabosz’s statements were made with a reasonable basis in law and fact. For instance, the evidence indicated Stabosz had been advised to report any illegal or unethical behavior by Friedman to the appropriate authorities, which he never did.

Legislative activity

No current legislative activity as of July 2024.

Of note

The Institute for Free Speech urges Indiana to improve the procedures of anti-SLAPP laws by, for instance, placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff to show a prima facie case.