Anti-SLAPP protection

Sections 554.07 to 554.19 of Article 18 adopt a version of the Universal Public Expression Protection Act to provide defendants with a “special motion for expedited relief.”

Law summary

Minnesota’s anti-SLAPP statute applies to those facing litigation based on the exercise of their rights to freedom of speech, press, petition, assembly, and association, under the federal or state constitution, “on a matter of public concern.” It also applies to communication in a governmental proceeding, as well as communication that concerns an issue under consideration in a governmental proceeding.

The party that filed the motion must first prove that Minnesota’s anti-SLAPP statute applies. Then, the burden of proof shifts to the responding party. If the responding party fails to present a valid legal claim, or if the moving party shows that the claim either lacks legal merit or raises no genuine issue of material fact, the court must dismiss the case with prejudice.

There are exceptions to Minnesota’s anti-SLAPP statute, including claims filed against or by a government unit or a government employee acting in their official capacity. Other examples of exceptions include lawsuits seeking recovery for bodily injury or wrongful death, insurance claims and “any claim brought under federal law.”

Legal actions

Minnesota’s anti-SLAPP law includes four actions for those facing frivolous and malicious lawsuits.

• Special motion for expedited relief: The statute allows a case to be dismissed quickly. The motion must be filed within 60 days after a claim is brought against the defendant or “at a later time on a showing of good cause.” From that point, the court must hold a hearing within 60 days of the motion being filed unless an exception is made.The court must then issue a ruling within 60 days of the hearing.
• Stay: All discovery and other pending hearings and motions are stayed under the statute, although the court can request limited discovery if necessary.
• Interlocutory appeal: After the motion is ruled on, either party can move to immediately appeal it. The stay provision continues to apply until after the appeal is decided. An appeal must be filed within 30 days of the order’s entry.
• Fee recovery: The court can award court costs, attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses to the prevailing party. If the case is voluntarily dismissed without prejudice, the moving party is still able to “obtain a ruling on the motion” and recover costs.

Helpful cases

Since Minnesota’s anti-SLAPP law recently went into effect, there are not many cases that refer to it. However, decisions based on Minnesota’s previous anti-SLAPP law can offer insight into how courts have interpreted anti-SLAPP legislation in the past, including what constitutes “public participation.”

Freeman, et al. v. Swift (2009)

In 2007, Nexus, a Minnesota nonprofit that operates a juvenile sex-offender treatment facility, announced plans to relocate its facility to Bradbury Township. Janette Swift, a resident of Bradbury Township, led an organization to oppose the relocation. As part of her efforts, Swift managed a website and blog. Peter Freeman, a volunteer and board member for Nexus, and CEO James D’Angelo sued Swift for defamation over blog entries about D’Angelo and for an email sent to the dean of the university where Freeman worked. In response, Swift moved to dismiss the lawsuit under the state’s anti-SLAPP law, claiming that the conduct in question was “public participation.” The district court denied her motion, and its decision was affirmed on appeal. The statements in question were not found to be “genuinely aimed” at procuring favorable government action. The court of appeals held that the anti-SLAPP statute applied to communications addressed both to government entities and third parties; whether a statement qualified for immunity under Minnesota’s anti-SLAPP statute was dependent on the nature and purpose of the statement, as well as its intended audience. If speech was found to be “genuinely aimed in whole or in part at procuring favorable government action,” a case would be dismissed unless a plaintiff offered “clear and convincing evidence” of defamation. In this specific case, Freeman and D’Angelo met the “clear and convincing evidence” standard.

Nexus v. Swift (2010)

Connected to the prior case, Swift was vocally opposed to Nexus’ plans to build a new residential treatment facility for juvenile sex offenders. In multiple communications, including in a public hearing, a YouTube video and statements on her websites and blogs, Swift made statements referencing a young boy who had allegedly died under Nexus’ care. Swift refused Nexus’ request to retract and remove a statement, and she continued to post about Nexus and its alleged conduct on her blog. In 2008, these statements were included in Nexus’ defamation lawsuit against Swift. In response, Swift filed a motion under Minnesota’s anti-SLAPP law. Nexus argued that the internet postings were not “genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action” and that a dismissal of the case would violate their constitutional rights. The company also argued that it had “clear and convincing evidence” of defamation and that if the court ruled in the alternative, that discovery should be allowed before any issues of malice were determined. The district court denied Swift’s motion, ordering full discovery and finding that “if the anti-SLAPP statute were construed to require it to grant Swift’s motion,” then the statute would violate Nexus’ rights to due process and trial by jury. The court found that “full” discovery was warranted. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case, stating that the district court didn’t apply the appropriate standard as required by the statute. The appeals court held that the anti-SLAPP statute did not violate the federal or state constitution, including Nexus’ rights to due process and trial by jury. It also found that the “public participation” requirement to qualify under the anti-SLAPP law did not exclude “internet speech.”

Marchant v. St. Anthony West (2005)

The St. Anthony West Neighborhood Organization Inc. (STAWNO) opposed the design of a development proposed by Marchant Inc.  The neighborhood group’s president wrote a letter for the Minneapolis Planning Department opposing the zoning and variances application. Marchant sued St. Anthony West and those who led the organization on multiple counts, including defamation. STAWNO made a motion under Minnesota’s previous anti-SLAPP statute. In its ruling, the court decided that St. Anthony West was immune from the proceedings, finding that Marchant failed to show that the contested statements in the letter “conveyed a defamatory meaning.” The court also ruled that the neighborhood group was allowed to recover attorneys’ fees. On appeal, Marchant argued that STAWNO is not entitled to immunity, citing the letter that states that the organization met “countless times” with developers who “refused to listen” to their concerns. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals found “countless” was hyperbolic, “listened” was used figuratively, and the “we” in the letter did not specify who met with developers. Considering this language, the Court of Appeals decided the contested statements could not be proven as true or false. The opinion states that “even assuming that all facts alleged in the complaint are true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Marchant’s favor, it has not met this high, statutorily imposed burden.” Because it prevailed, STAWNO was entitled to attorneys’ fees.

Legislative activity

In 1994, Minnesota enacted anti-SLAPP legislation (Minn. Stat. Secs. 554.01 to 554.06) that aimed to protect “public participation,” defined as “speech or lawful conduct that is genuinely aimed in whole or in part at procuring favorable government action.” Under the chapter, once it was established the conduct in question was covered under the anti-SLAPP law, the respondent to a defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion had the burden of persuasion. Unless they provided clear and convincing evidence that the moving party is not immune from liability, the court ruled in favor of the motion.

The old law had several similarities to other anti-SLAPP laws. If a motion was successful, the prevailing party could be awarded with both attorney fees and damages. Discovery was stayed until after a motion was ruled on.

In 2017, chapter 554.02 was found unconstitutional in Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minnesota by violating the right to jury trial. The opinion states that the role of “resolving disputed facts belongs to the jury, not the court.” The Minnesota Supreme Court also found the chapter to be unconstitutional by requiring the responding party to meet a higher burden of proof before trial (clear and convincing evidence) than it would have to meet at trial (preponderance of the evidence). Although only one section of the anti-SLAPP statute was found to be unconstitutional, without the procedure, the entire section was essentially unenforceable.

Minnesota did not pass a new anti-SLAPP law until it adopted UPEPA language in 2024. The section applies to causes of actions asserted after the law went into effect on May 24, 2024. The UPEPA invokes a different standard of proof. Under the statute, the standard of proof must include “any evidence that could be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”

Of note

Minnesota became the eighth state to adopt the UPEPA in 2024.