Anti-SLAPP protection

Alabama does not have an anti-SLAPP statute.

Helpful cases

While Alabama courts have never referred to SLAPPs in their decisions, these cases offer insight into how judges have interpreted lawsuits against publishers.

Blevins v. W.F. Barnes Corporation et al (1999)

When Jerry Blevins’ paralegal complained about smoke in her office, located in a building owned by W.F. Barnes, and the problem was not resolved, she sued Barnes and was granted a temporary restraining order to ban smoking on her floor of the building. The Montgomery Advertiser ran a story about the lawsuit and restraining order. A follow-up story quoted Barnes complaining about Blevins and reported that he had requested an investigation into Blevins’ practice. Blevins sued Barnes and the newspaper on multiple counts, including defamation. The statements in question include a quote from Barnes saying Blevins “tried to extort money out of me because I refused to pay his demands” and a letter Barnes wrote to the attorney general requesting an investigation into Blevins. The trial court granted summary judgment for Barnes and the newspaper. The Court of Appeals ruled the alleged defamation in the word “extort” Barnes used was “rhetorical hyperbole” and did not imply guilt in criminal extortion. When read in the context of the article, the opinion states the quote fails to impugn “Blevins’ professional reputation.” Therefore, the trial court’s decision on the quote was affirmed.The appeals court, however, reversed the trial court’s decision on the statements written by Barnes to the attorney general. In the letter, Barnes alleged Blevins sought information about Barnes’s finances and conspired with his employee to both make false complaints regarding the smoke and to seek $25,000 from Barnes to settle a “frivolous lawsuit.” The Court of Appeals ruled these statements were enough to be considered defamatory and were not protected by absolute privilege. The Court of Appeals subsequently reversed the trial court’s decision on the letter and remanded for further proceedings on the claim.

McCaig v. Talladega Publishing Company (1989)

An article in Daily Home, published by Talladega Publishing Company, reported “irregularities” had been found in an inspection completed by Coosa Valley Co-op Board officers into meters at several businesses. The information had been relayed to an editor at Daily Home by employees of Coosa Valley Electric Cooperative. Some of the violations found by the inspection pertained to meters belonging to Travis and Roy McCaig. The McCaigs sued defendants on multiple counts, including alleged libel and slander. The trial court found the testimony to show the facts reported in the article to be true, and “because truth is always an absolute defense to any action for libel or slander,” the contested statements could not be defamatory. Because of the truthfulness of the article, the allegation that the defendants had conspired to libel the plaintiffs also failed. The trial court’s decision was affirmed by the Alabama Supreme Court, with one judge dissenting.

Fulton v. The Advertiser Company (1980)

As a result of an investigation into “alleged abuses and misconduct” within the State of Alabama Building Commission, six employees were fired. David Bronner, the state Finance Director who led the investigation and a defendant in this case, held a press conference regarding the dismissals. The next morning, the Advertiser published an article covering the investigation and dismissals. Two of the fired employees filed complaints for libel and slander against both Bronner and the Advertiser, referencing a press release, statements made at the press conference and the Advertiser’s article.They claimed they were unaware of the allegations or charges against them until reading the Advertiser article. The trial court granted summary judgment for both of the defendants. The court found that “the Advertiser’s report of the press conference was fair and that Bronner’s privilege also protected the newspaper.” The Alabama Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision. The court found Bronner and the Advertiser failed to prove there had been an “absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact.” While they agreed the Advertiser would have been protected by Bronner’s conditional privilege if the article had fairly and accurately reported on the press conference, the court found that the article and the headline presented a “genuine issue to material fact” in their imputation of criminal activity and “guilt of all four categories of misconduct.” The opinion references the report’s focus on parts of a financial report and exclusions of other “relevant portions,” the absence of the words “qualifications and performance” despite Bronner stating that this was the reason for the dismissal in his affidavit and no evidence of an independent investigation by the Advertiser into the validity of Bronner’s statements.

Legislative activity

While Alabama has attempted to pass bills regarding frivolous lawsuits in the past, lawmakers have not considered anti-SLAPP statute.

Additional

The state has statutes intended to protect those facing frivolous lawsuits. For example, under Section 6-5-156.5 of the Alabama civil code, “if the action is brought by a private citizen and the court finds that the action was frivolous or motivated by bad faith, costs and attorney fees may be taxed to the person.”