Anti-SLAPP protection

Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1, was created in 2022.

Law summary

Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute protects individuals and entities from lawsuits that are intended to silence their exercise of free speech and petition rights on public issues. The broadly constructed law encourages public participation by ensuring that constitutional rights are not hindered by abusive legal actions. The law protects a person’s right of petition or free speech, including written or oral statements made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding; expression in connection with an issue under consideration by a legislative, executive, or judicial body; in a place open to the public; or in connection with a public issue or an issue of public concern (O.C.G.A. § 9–11–11.1 (c) (1)–(4)).

Law features

Georgia’s law includes several tools for those facing SLAPPs.

• Special motion to strike: A claim against someone for actions supporting their right to petition or free speech “in connection with an issue of public interest or concern” (O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b)(1)) can be challenged with a motion to strike.
• Motion hearing timeline: The motion to strike must be heard within 30 days of service unless it must be delayed due to an emergency.
• Two-step analysis: The analysis of an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss involves two steps. First, the court must decide whether the party filing the anti-SLAPP motion has reached the threshold of showing that the challenged claim is a protected activity. If so, the court must decide whether the plaintiffs have established that there is a probability that they will prevail on the claim.
• Attorney fees: The party that wins a motion to strike can recover their attorney’s fees and legal costs. Frivolous motions to strike, however, can lead to the opposing party receiving attorney’s fees.
• Exclusions. The law does not apply to actions brought by the attorney general, prosecuting attorney, or city attorneys acting as prosecutors.

Helpful cases

Georgia courts have consistently adhered to the two-step process for motions to dismiss as outlined in Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute. These cases highlight how the state’s courts have evaluated the legal sufficiency of the complaints and the supporting evidence presented.

Morgan v. Mainstreet Newspapers (2023)

Scott Morgan, a city councilman for the City of Bethlehem, sued Mainstreet Newspapers for libel over a news article that mentioned Morgan’s dispute with his neighbors. The trial court granted Mainstreet’s motion to dismiss under the state’s anti-SLAPP law. The court determined the publication fell within the protection afforded by the law and then concluded there was no probability Morgan would prevail in his action. The trial court noted that Morgan was a public official and had pointed to no evidence of actual malice. Additionally, the court concluded that the statements about which Morgan complained were either opinion, truthful, or non-defamatory. Morgan appealed. The Georgia Court of Appeals upheld the lower court’s ruling.

Equity Prime Mortgage v. Greene for Congress (2022)

In 2020, Equity Prime Mortgage (EPM) sued Congressional candidate Marjorie Taylor Greene and her campaign for defamation and false light invasion of privacy. The lawsuit was based on Greene’s social media posts and political ads related to EPM’s firing of an employee, who was the stepmother of a police officer involved in a fatal shooting. EPM alleged that Greene’s campaign conspired with the stepmother to publicly smear the company after her dismissal. The trial court dismissed the case under Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute, but EPM appealed. The Court of Appeals agreed that Greene’s speech was of public interest but ruled that the trial court failed to fully consider the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. The appeals court noted that the trial court did not properly review EPM’s complaint and evidence; instead, it focused solely on Greene’s defenses (that her statements were opinions or conditionally privileged) and concluded that EPM could not win. The appeals court emphasized that the trial court needed to determine if EPM had made a legally strong claim, rather than predicting who is more likely to win. The case was sent back to the trial court to reconsider the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

NEFF v. McGee (2018)

In 2017, Christal McGee sued Michael Neff and his law firm for defamation over an article on the firm’s website and Neff’s statements to the media. The interviews were related to the dangers of Snapchat’s Speed Filter and an automobile collision that occurred when McGee was allegedly using the Speed Filter to capture a photo documenting her high speed. Neff’s clients were injured in the collision. Neff filed a motion to strike McGee’s complaint under Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute, but the trial court denied the motion. Neff then filed an appeal. The Court of Appeals found that Neff’s statements were protected by conditional privilege. Because of this protection, McGee was unlikely to succeed in her defamation claim. As a result, the higher court reversed the trial court’s decision and granted Neff’s request to dismiss or strike the case under Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute.

Legislative activity

Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute was enacted in 1996 and initially was limited in scope to the statements made during a legislative, executive, or judicial proceedings, or in connection with an issue under review. In 2016 the anti-SLAPP statute was broadened to include posts on social media.

Of note

The Institute for Free Speech rated Georgia’s anti-SLAPP procedures as excellent, awarding them 100 out of 100 points.